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Budget deﬁcits1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD) occurs through devolution of responsibilities for public spending and revenue collection from the
central to local governments. FD has been a feature of economic reform programs based on the following arguments:
(i) decentralization of spending increases efﬁciency because local governments have better local information and hence can better
match policies with the preferences of citizens (Samuelson, 1954; Oates, 1972, 1993); (ii) decentralization of ﬁscal activity
increases accountability and transparency of public good delivery (de Mello, 2000a); and (iii) taxpayers are more willing to
cooperate with the accountable local governments (Wasylenko, 1987).1 Following on from these arguments, we would predict
that FD decreases government deﬁcits. With the exception of De Mello, 2000b), this prediction has not received much attention.2
De Mello (2000b) examined ﬁscal structures in a number of countries and reported negative effects on ﬁscal balances due to
coordination failures in intergovernmental ﬁscal relations, especially in low-income countries.3 The study reported here goes
beyond de Mello (2000b) in addressing the role of the institutional and structural factors that inﬂuence the relationship between
FD and budget deﬁcits and in treating separately expenditure and revenue decentralization.terature on FD, groups studies according to optimal division of powers (decentralization theorem), the role
tions.
04), both of which found a negative relationship between revenue decentralization and inﬂation. Davood
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156 B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166An investigation of the effects of FD on budget deﬁcits should address both expenditure and revenue aspects of FD. The literature
emphasizes that decentralization of ﬁscal expenditures may increase the efﬁciency of local public good delivery when a country is
large, heterogeneous, or ethno-linguistically fractionalized because it is especially in these cases that local governments are in a
better position than the central government to assess local preferences.4
While decentralizing budgetary spending may be efﬁciency enhancing, expenditure and revenue decentralization can have
drawbacks. Local governments may have limited tax bases or fail to take full advantage of existing tax bases, and local debt
issuance and management capacity may be limited.5 Limited revenue autonomy of local governments implies that their
expenditure autonomy is also limited, making local governments mere spending units of central governments. The common pool
problem arising from not-fully internalized costs of local ﬁscal actions may lead ﬁscal imbalances to increase. These disadvantages
may be so great as to outweigh the increased likelihood of taxpayer compliance in revenue collection when ﬁscal activity is
decentralized. Moreover, FD without an effective central redistributive system may result a more unequal income distribution if
revenue bases vary across regions (see, for example, Zhang, 2006 and Bouton et al., 2008).
There are various arguments against expenditure decentralization. First, local governments may lack of economies of scale in
the provision of public goods; information and coordination costs may be higher for local governments because of lack of
institutional and administrative capacity.6 Secondly, if local vested interests are powerful, decentralization may increase
corruption and social fragmentation in the absence of local accountability.7 Thirdly, decentralizationmay increase competition and
political tension among local governments. Fourthly, coordination problems across different tiers of the government may lead to a
deﬁcit bias and thus hinder ﬁscal reforms and implementation ofmacroeconomic adjustment. Finally, the central governmentmay
unable to credibly commit to a hard-budget constraint (no bailout of the local government) due to political concerns (Goodspeed,
2002). The literature therefore proposes arguments both in favor and against the effectiveness of ﬁscal decentralization in
improving ﬁscal performance.8 Tanzi (2000) notes that the effectiveness of FD in improving allocative efﬁciency depends on such
factors as the size of country, the extent of privatization in the economy; ability of local governments to raise revenue;
transparency; and local administrative and institutional capacity.9
In viewof the foregoing arguments and the commonpool problem (seeHillman, 2009 chapter 9), decentralization of ﬁscal activity
is predicted to increase theﬁscal burden. This problemcan in principle be limitedor eliminated through local accountability and “good
governance”. Efﬁciency gains of ﬁscal decentralization in large heterogeneous countries may compensate for the increase in the
spending bias. I account for structural and institutional factors, including country size, quality of governance, local accountability, and
the extent of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and test the hypothesis that the disciplining effect of FD is conditioned by these factors.
The evidence presented in this paper provides strong support for the hypothesis that both expenditure and revenue
decentralization reduce budget deﬁcits. The effectiveness of ﬁscal decentralization in reducing deﬁcits is enhanced by greater
population, although deﬁcits increase with population size on average. There is also suggestive evidence that the beneﬁts of FD
through ﬁscal discipline increase when governance and local accountability are inadequate. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
enhances the effectiveness of revenue decentralization in achieving ﬁscal discipline but not expenditure decentralization. Output
growth, income levels, and governance and local accountability reduce budget deﬁcits. The impact of the size of the government is
signiﬁcantly positive, as expected. These results generally survive robustness tests.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical ﬁndings.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
Sub-national levels of government are not uniform across countries. For consistency, this study takes the sum of local and state
and provincial levels of government where both available as the indicator of sub-national government activity.10 Expenditure
decentralization is measured as the share in total government spending of the spending of both state and provincial governments
and local governments (FDexp). Revenue decentralization (FDrev) is measured in the same manner, using data on revenues4 Adam et al. (2008) provide evidence in favor of increased public sector efﬁciency associated with FD in the OECD region. Kyriacou and Sagales (2009) show
that the evidence regarding FD's effect on government efﬁciency depends on countries' level of development and institutional characteristics.
5 There may be legally imposed limitations on sub-national borrowing in some cases.
6 See, for example, Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), and Bradhan and Mookherjee (1998).
7 Based on a study of Russian case, Fleinkman and Pleakanov (2005) observe that decentralization distorts incentives particularly in rentier regions, and
propose a higher degree of intraregional decentralization in such regions.
8 Among the empirical cross-sectional studies, de Mello (2000a) shows that higher social capital, deﬁned as conﬁdence in government, civic cooperation and
associational activity, is positively related with ﬁscal decentralization. De Mello and Barenstein (2001) also ﬁnd evidence that good governance is positively
related with sub-national spending levels, and the higher are non-tax revenues the stronger is this relationship. Fisman and Gatti (2002) ﬁnd a strong negative
relationship between expenditure decentralization and corruption, although Treisman (2000) observes no signiﬁcant relationship between the two variables,
due possibly to different measures of corruption and inclusion of more control variables. Based on the case of China, Chen (2004) argues that revenue
decentralization may lead to a helping-hand form of corruption. Case studies on the effects of FD are generally inconclusive (see, for example, Barrett, 2000;
Dethier, 2000; Eaton, 2001; Faguet, 2001; Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Hope, 2000; Lin and Liu, 2000; Neyapti, 2005; Norris et al., 2000).
9 See for example Panizza (1999), Von Braun and Grote (2002), and De Mello (2000a). Tanzi (2008) argues that historical and global developments are
important for determining optimal ﬁscal arrangements (see also Vaubel, 2009, and Tanzi, 2009). Stegarescu (2009) proposes that integration has increased FD in
the OECD region.
10 For a check of robustness, I also repeated the regression analysis using two other alternative deﬁnitions of decentralization: i) the ratio of state and provincial
government expenditure (or revenues) to the total of central and state and provincial expenditures (or revenues) and ii) the ratio of local spending (or revenues)
to the total of central and local expenditures (or revenues). The results of those regressions are discussed.
157B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166instead of expenditures.11 The main source of these data, detailed descriptions of which are provided in Appendix 1, is the
Government Financial Statistics of the IMF.
Drawing on the discussions by Oates (1972) and Panizza (1999), I focus on the “decentralizable” part of ﬁscal spending to
correctly measure the extent of decentralization; social security and defence spending are considered to account for the main part
of non-decentralizable government spending. Because social security spending is larger in high-income than low-income
countries, the exclusion of this component avoids a potential bias in the results.12
The data covers up to 19 years of observation, ranging from 1980 to 1998, for 16 countries.13 The panel is unbalanced and the
number of observations is 172 and 203 for the estimations of FDexp and FDrev, respectively.14 The estimations are separately run
for FDexp and FDrev.15
Based on the above descriptions of FDexp and FDrev, the followingmodels are estimated, where FD is used as a generic notation
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20.9 forðDef =GDPÞit = α0 + α1FDit + α2ðFDit*IijÞ + α3Git + α4GDPgrit + α5GNIpcij + α6Iij + εitThe subscript it stands for country i at time t. Def/GDP stands for general government budget deﬁcits in percentages of GDP;
G is the ratio of general government expenditures in GDP; GDPgr is the growth in real GDP; and GNIpc is the (log of) per capita
gross national income. G is added to the estimation since government size is often argued to cause inefﬁciency and thus higher
deﬁcits. GDPgr is added to control for business cycles since they also have potential to affect the size of deﬁcits.16 GNIpc is used as a
proxy for the level of development.
Iij in the above model stands for the various country-speciﬁc and institutional characteristics, denoted by subscript j, that
hardly change over time but changes across countries. Those characteristics (j's) that the literature suggests to be related with the
outcomes of FD are: country size, proxied by population (pop); the extent of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ethnoling); governance
indicators and; local accountability (locelec), which is proxied by a dummy that takes the value of one in case local elections exist and
zero otherwise. The average of the six indices of Kaufmannet al. (2002), namely, control of corruption; rule of law; political instability;
governmental efﬁciency; voice and accountability; and regulatory quality, are used as ameasure of governance (Gov).17 Each of these
variables (Ij's where j=1 to 4) are rescaled to numbers that range between 0 and 1 (see Appendix 1 for explanations and Appendix 2
for summary statistics). The resulting four indices, Ipop; Iethnoling; Ilocelec and Igov, are used to measure a country's structural and
institutional characteristics. These indices are used both as control variables and in interaction with the FD terms as the main
hypothesis of the current paper is that they inﬂuence the effectiveness of FD in reducing deﬁcits.18
Brambor et al. (2006) point out that the marginal effect of FD on Def/GDP should be observed by constructing conﬁdence
intervals for the estimates of (α1+α2) over the possible values of Ij. If the interval lies above (below) the zero line, then the effect
is signiﬁcantly positive (negative).19 Hence, one can identify the range of Ij values for which the effect of FD can be said to be
signiﬁcant. The authors show that evenwhen the coefﬁcient α2 is insigniﬁcant, it is possible to have a signiﬁcant marginal effect of
FD for a substantive range of Ij values. In the next section, I adopt this method to evaluate the effects of FD on deﬁcits.
2.1. Model speciﬁcation
Noting the limited country coverage of the panel due to data deﬁciencies, a ﬁxed effects model is not a preferred method of
estimation (see, for example, Kennedy, 1997). A ﬁxed effects model is inappropriate also because some of the key right hand side
variables are invariant over time. On the other hand, random effects speciﬁcation is also rejected based on theHausman test results.20not account for idiosyncracies in ﬁscal accounts across countries with regard to the extent of the separation of local revenue collection authority and
iture autonomy from the central government. The data may therefore have measurement problems, such as in case of shared revenues or grants
ng as own revenues of local governments in some countries, leading to a possible positive bias in the measurement of revenue decentralization.
e the social security and defence components of government spending are excluded, indicators of expenditure decentralization appear much higher in
come than low-income countries.
country list consists of: Austria, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
land and the US.
he regressions estimated with FDrev, the number of observations rises to 220 and 206 when using state and provincial level of data and local government
ta, respectively. The number of observations in the regressions estimated with FDexp does not change across alternative deﬁnitions.
ile the FD terms are both negatively signiﬁcant in the separate regressions (using a basic model that employs the rest of the control variables but not the
ive terms), when both are employed in the regression FDrev is positive and signiﬁcant, due possibly to high collinearity between FDrev and FDexp (0.91).
data source for these variables is International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
estimates for each of all the six governance variables are based on an analysis of wide-ranging data sources — comprised of both polls and surveys
ed in individual countries (see, Kaufmann et al., 2002).
bor et al. (2006) show that, to avoid inconsistencies in the estimation, it is necessary to include all of the constitutive terms in the regression that
s multiplicative interaction terms, as is done for the FD terms in this paper.
bor et al. (2006) show that it is incorrect to decide on the inclusion of the interactive term simply by looking at the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of the
ive variable.
sman (1978) proposes a test for the correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that, assuming that both OLS
are consistent, OLS is inefﬁcient, the alternative being OLS is consistent but GLS is not. Rejection of the null hypothesis thus leads to the rejection of
effects model, in favor of ﬁxed effects (see Hsiao, 1986, Greene, 1993, or Baltagi, 1995). The null hypothesis of random effects speciﬁcation being
nt is rejected at 1% level of signiﬁcance; for the baseline model, reported in column 1 of both Tables 1 and 2, the Chi-Square Test is 288.9 for FDexp and
FDrev, both signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 1
Estimation results with expenditure decentralization (FDexp).
Dependent variable: budget deﬁcits/GDP
Method: OLS with robust standard errors
Explanatory variables: I II III IV V VI
Constant 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.16***
(6.16) (6.28) (5.32) (5.48) (5.31) (5.55)
Trend −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001 −0.001** −0.002***
(−4.03) (−5.00) (−2.47) (−1.59) (−2.23) (−3.72)
Exp. Decentr.(FDexp) −0.08*** −0.09*** −0.07*** −0.42*** −0.35*** −0.17***
(−5.38) (−5.00) (−3.05) (−4.35) (−4.60) (−5.08)
FDexp-extreme 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
(1.91) (2.19) (1.27) (2.79) (1.13)
G 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.26***
(7.82) (8.05) (8.46) (9.62) (8.20) (8.58)
GDP gr −0.001** −0.001*** −0.001 −0.001 −0.001** −0.001**
(−2.15) (−2.18) (−1.42) (−1.51) (−2.15) (−2.10)
log(GNIpc) −0.02*** −0.01*** −0.02*** −0.03*** −0.02*** −0.01***
(−4.07) (−4.08) (−4.31) (−4.49) (−4.01) (−2.29)
FDexp*population −1.06***
(−3.46)
FDexp*governance 0.43***
(3.43)
FDexp*local elec.dummy 0.25***
(2.80)
FDexp*ethnoling.frac. 0.13***
(3.04)
Population 0.78*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.16***
(4.22) (8.13) (7.50) (7.30)
Governance 0.05 −0.10*** −0.03*** −0.03
(1.53) (−2.61) (−2.14) (0.94)
Local elections −0.02* 0.01 −0.03*** −0.01
(−1.74) (0.55) (−2.14) (−1.19)
Ethnoling.Frac. 0.004 −0.03*** −0.01 −0.05**
(0.56) (−2.90) (−1.30) (−2.29)
Adjusted R-square 0.41 0.42 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.55
Wald test for the FD terms 30.28*** 13.84*** 0.48 13.63*** 2.83*
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 16
Number of observations: 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
158 B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166To investigate the stationary of the basic model (reported in column 1 of Tables 1 and 2), Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) tests, assuming
homogenous unit root processes, are performed for each of the model variables.21 After correcting for serial correlation and using
the lag lengths according to the Schwartz Information Criteria (SCI), LLC-test results (see Appendix 4) indicate that, the FD terms
are trend-stationary. Accordingly, a trend term was added to estimate the above speciﬁcation.
To explore the endogeneity of the FD terms, the Hausman test of endogeneity is employed. To this end, FDexp (FDrev) is
regressed on all the right hand side variables and lagged deﬁcits. This exercise reveals that in many of the speciﬁcations involving
different Ij's and FD terms either the lagged deﬁcit term is insigniﬁcant or only marginally signiﬁcant, or the inclusion of the
residuals from this ﬁrst stage regression reveals no signiﬁcant effect, or both.22 As a result, in what follows FD is treated as an
exogenous variable, where the estimations are conducted using OLS with heteroscedasticity correction in the error terms.23
3. Estimation results
In this section, the main hypothesis of the paper, that ﬁscal decentralization has a signiﬁcant relationship with budget deﬁcits
especially under certain structural and institutional conditions, is tested using both expenditure (FDexp) and revenue measures of
ﬁscal decentralization (FDrev).
Tables 1 and 2 report the estimation results of the model for FDexp and FDrev as the dependent variable, respectively. Columns
I and II in both tables report a version of the abovemodel excluding the Ij terms so as tomark the improvements in the explanatory
power of the model brought about by the addition of these terms, which are reported in the subsequent columns. Column II21 Maddala (1998) reports that LL-test, and not the IPS test, is appropriate for panels that are unbalanced as the one employed in the current paper.
22 The results are available from the author upon request.
23 In addition to correcting for heteroscedasticity, estimations that also allow for autocorrelation correction has been performed, leading to slightly weaker but
virtually the same results as those currently reported in the paper.
Table 2
Estimation results with revenue decentralization (FDrev).
Dependent variable: budget deﬁcits/GDP
Method: OLS with robust standard errors
Explanatory variables: I II III IV V VI
Constant 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.16***
(7.62) (8.75) (5.94) (4.22) (6.72) (5.11)
Trend −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.002*** −0.001*** −0.002***
(−4.94) (−4.82) (−5.22) (−5.17) (−4.59) (−5.49)
Rev. Decentr.(FDrev) −0.03** −0.07** −0.04 −0.12 −0.41*** −0.07
(−2.07) (−2.89) (−1.16) (−1.15) (−4.79) (−1.50)
FDrev-extreme 0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.002 0.01
(2.68) (1.18) (0.66) (0.10) (0.51)
G 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.26***
(8.33) (9.15) (9.67) (10.03) (9.24) (9.77)
GDP gr −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001** −0.001
(−1.59) (−1.54) (−1.38) (1.53) (2.01) (1.59)
log(GNIpc) −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.01**
(−5.86) (−6.55) (−3.71) (−3.15) (−4.42) (−2.47)
FDrev*population −0.69*
(−1.88)
FDrev*governance 0.09
(0.65)
FDrev* local elec.dummy 0.40***
(3.88)
FDrev*ethnoling.frac. −0.04
(−0.64)
Population 0.40*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(2.64) (5.08) (6.22) (6.57)
Governance −0.02 −0.06** −0.02 −0.05**
(0.91) (−2.12) (0.65) (−1.95)
Local elections −0.02** −0.01* −0.05*** −0.01
(−2.22) (−1.69) (−3.75) (−1.56)
Ethnoling.Frac. −0.001 −0.01 −0.001 −0.01
(−0.20) (−0.73) (−0.09) (−0.79)
Adjusted R-square 0.35 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47
Wald test for the FD terms 3.91** 0.25 0.83 0.80
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Number of observations: 209 209 209 209 209 209
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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“extreme values” of FD.24 This modiﬁcation is made to explore the potentially different effects of high and low values of FD on
deﬁcits. In view of the signiﬁcance of this term, it is kept for the rest of the regressions.
Due to the high level of collinearity among the interaction terms Ij (see Appendix 3), the regressions in columns III to VI are
reported with one interaction term at a time.25 Based on Brambor et al. (2006), Appendix 5a and 5b provide the plots of 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the marginal effects of FDexp and FDrev on deﬁcits, respectively, in case of the four Iij terms, each of which
is measured within the interval of [0, 1] as described in the previous section.
The results reported in Columns I and II of both Tables 1 and 2 primarily indicate that both FDexp and FDrev have negative and
signiﬁcant effects on deﬁcits. Following Thiessen (2003), the extreme values of both FDexp and FDrev are also included in the
estimation, although their positive effect on deﬁcits is not robustly signiﬁcant. In all the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2, the
size of the government (G), the trend term, the level of economic development (log(GNIpc)), and economic growth (GDPgr) have a
signiﬁcant effect in the expected directions: the ﬁrst being positive and the rest being negative, although the signiﬁcance of GDPgr
is not robust. In addition, direct effects on deﬁcit of both the population size and the local elections dummy are signiﬁcant, where
the sign of the ﬁrst one is positive and of the latter one is negative.2624 Extreme values of FD are selected by adding and subtracting one standard deviation to the median values of the respective FD measure observed in the
current sample. Hence, the extreme values are those above 0.60 and below 0.20 for FDexp, and above 0.35 and below 0.05 for FDrev. Alternatively, the square of
the FD term is used in order to explore the non-linearity in the effect of FD, as was originally done in Thiessen (2003). This alternative yields very similar results
to those with the extreme values. Since the squared term is highly correlated with the actual series (97%), however, I prefer to report the results with the
extreme values in order to single out the effects of relatively high or relatively low values of FD.
25 Appendix 3 shows thatmost of the interactive terms, indicated by shaded cells, exhibit correlations both with each other andwith the FD terms bymore than 80%.
26 The variability for the local election dummy comes from the less developed sample, where the negative sign may imply moral hazard.
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constructed on the basis of the reported coefﬁcient estimates and their variance/covariance matrices, lead to the following
observations. The higher the size of the population, the higher is the deﬁcit reducing effect of FDexp.27 While for all possible
ranges of ethnolinguistic fractionalization FDexp has a deﬁcit reducing effect, this effect declines with the extent of ethnic
fractionalization, possibly due to the disadvantages of increased competition among the heterogeneous groups.28
For the most part of the possible range of governance measures, FDexp has a deﬁcit reducing effect; however, this effect
declines as governance improves. Good governance already has a negative effect on deﬁcits and FDexp has less and less marginal
contribution to this effect as governance improves. Similar to the case of governance, it appears that the presence of local elections
already accounts for low deﬁcits and FDexp does not contribute to this effect, at least in the sample investigated in this paper.
Noting that the variation for the local elections dummy arises due to the set of less developed countries only, an alternative
explanation can be that the presence of local elections coupled with FD may induce moral hazard in the form of lower tax
collection incentives for local governments so as to increase their reelectability.29
Investigation of the corresponding graphs for FDrev, as shown in Appendix 5b, reveals the following observations. As in the
case of FDexp, FDrev has a signiﬁcant deﬁcit reducing effect for all possible ranges of values of population, and this effect increases
the greater the size of population. The impact of having local elections on the deﬁcit reducing effect of FDrev is similar to the case of
FDexp.30 Unlike FDexp, however, the deﬁcit reducing effect of FDrev is not affected by either gov or ethnoling.
3.1. Testing robustness with alternative measures of FD
As a separate experiment, a combined measure of FDexp and FDrev is formed by simple averaging of these two measures
(call it FD). Using this measure, estimations yield the same ﬁndings as above for the case of population; in addition, however,
ethnolingusitic fractionalization, governance and local elections now all appear to contribute to the effectiveness of FD in
reducing deﬁcits.31
In another experiment with variable deﬁnitions, instead of the extreme values of FD, the effect of only the extremely high
values of FD on budget deﬁcits is investigated. This experiment leaves the formerly reported results virtually unchanged.
The regressions reported above are also repeated using “state and provincial” and “local” data, separately.32 The results of these
regressions, especially in the case of state and provincial level data, are mostly similar to the results reported above, and therefore
are not reported.33 The differences from the previously reported ﬁndings are as follows. Using only local level data, local elections
do not appear to matter for the effectiveness of FDexp, whereas the effectiveness of FDrev increases with ethnoling and decreases
with gov. With the state and provincial level data, the only difference observed is the signiﬁcant effect of lower values of ethnoling
on the effectiveness of FDrev. In conclusion, these exercises robustly reveal that the effectiveness of FD in reducing deﬁcits
increases with the size of population.
Stegarescu (2005) argues that the share of sub-national spending (or revenues) in general government spending (or revenues)
is potentially a problematic measure of ﬁscal decentralization since it does not necessarily reﬂect the actual assignment of ﬁscal
resources and responsibilities to the sub-national units of the government. This author therefore proposes alternative measures of
both tax and revenue decentralization (RD) that incorporates legal aspects of ﬁscal decision making. Comparing FDrev with
Stagerascu's measures of RD for four countries reveals that FDrev exhibits a downward bias in comparison with RD2 and RD3 for
three of them.34 While the current analysis does not employ Stegarescu's measures partly due to insufﬁcient match between
the two data sets, replicating this study using those measures may be a subject for future research.
As noted in Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) and Stegarescu (2005), grants and transfers can be mechanism for the central government
to exercise control over sub-national decisions. In order to obtain measures of ﬁscal decentralization that potentially eliminate
such biases,35 I replicated the estimations after adjusting the current measures of FD by subtracting grants from revenues and
transfers from expenditures of both the sub-national and general government. This adjustment reduces the number of data points
by 28 for both of the resulting measures of ﬁscal decentralization (expdec and revdec). The FD measures used in the current study
are generally higher than these adjusted measures, although the magnitude of biases is not notable in many cases.36 The marginal27 To control for the size of the country, I alternatively used the area of the country (also normalized between 0 and 1, like the other Ij terms). The results are
virtually the same as in case of population and are therefore not reported.
28 The negative direct effect of Iethnoling is due to the LDC sample only; a reverse effect is observed in the DC sub-sample. These results are available from the
author upon request.
29 The dummy takes the value of 1 for all developed countries in the sample.
30 Note that the variation for the local elections dummy comes from the less developed countries only; it takes the value of 1 for all developed countries in the sample.
31 These results are available from the author upon request.
32 The number of observations in regressions where FDrev is used rises to 226 and 212, respectively, when state and provincial level data and local level of
government data are used. The number of observations in the regressions using the alternative deﬁnitions of FDexp does not change.
33 One exception is that the formerly observed anomalous positive coefﬁcient of FDrev in interaction with Igov is no more signiﬁcant in regressions using both
state–provincial and local level data.
34 A comparison for a subset of observations identiﬁed in view of Table A3 of Stegarescu (2005) can be seen in Appendix 6.
35 IMF-GFS does not provide data that distinguish between conditional/unconditional or rule-based versus discretionary grants or transfers.
36 Data on grants and transfers are missing for Iran and Mexico, in addition to several yearly observations for the other countries in the list. Calculated
differences between FD measures and Stegarescu's measures, which are available from the author upon request, are of the order of less than 0.01.
161B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166effects of both expdec and revdec are observed to increase in the population size, as has been reported earlier, while the other
variables do not seem to affect their effectiveness. If the adjusted measures are indeed more unbiased estimates of ﬁscal
decentralization, these ﬁndings strengthen the observation that the effectiveness of both types of ﬁscal decentralization increases
with the size of population.4. Conclusions
The research on the relationship between socio-economic variables and ﬁscal decentralization (FD) has been rather
inconclusive about the beneﬁts of FD. The current paper is the ﬁrst to investigate the effect of FD on government budget
deﬁcits in a panel sample, explicitly accounting for the structural and institutional factors that the literature suggests affect this
relationship.
The evidence that has been presented reveals a signiﬁcant negative effect of ﬁscal decentralization on deﬁcits. The
ﬁndings however also caution about an unconditional policy recommendation of ﬁscal decentralization, as the evidence
also reveals that country characteristics and institutional features signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the effectiveness of ﬁscal de-
centralization in reducing deﬁcits. The current study indicates that the effectiveness of ﬁscal decentralization in reducing
deﬁcits is enhanced by the size of population, even though deﬁcits, on average, are positively associated with population
size.
The results also draw attention to the following observations. While expenditure decentralization is more effective in case of
low degrees of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and governance, these features do not seem to inﬂuence the effectiveness of
revenue decentralization. FD also seems to be more effective in the absence of local elections, which may be associated withmoral
hazard in less developed countries. Because different speciﬁcations of the FD variables reveal different effects of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, governance, and local elections on the effectiveness of FD, deriving policy conclusions may require further
analysis in larger samples.Acknowledgements
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paper.Appendix 1. Variable descriptions and sourcesDeﬁcit/GDP Overall deﬁcits (% of GDP) IMF —International Financial Statistics
Exp. Decentr.(FDexp) Expenditure decentralization: IMF —Government Financial Statistics
=(total expenditures of state, provincial and local governments)/
(total government spending−social security,
welfare and defence spending)
Rev. Decentr.(FDrev) Revenue decentralization: IMF —Government Financial Statistics
=(total revenues of state, provincial and local governments) /
(total government revenues )
G/GDP =Total government spending/GDP IMF —International Financial Statistics
GDPgr GDP growth rate (constant LCU) IMF —International Financial Statistics
GNIpc =(Log of) gross national income per capita IMF —International Financial Statistics
Population (Ipop) Index of population World Bank, WDI
=(Population/1 billion, such that all values in the sample range
between 0 and 1)
Governance (Igov) Average of the “normalized” indices of 6 governance indicators. Kaufmann et al. (2002)
The individual indices are “normalized” between 0 and 1, where
1 corresponds to the largest value for each of the 6 indicators
among the original set of 102 countries.
Local elections (Ilocelec) Dummy variable Beck et al. (2001); also see Database of
Political Institutions, The World Bank.=(1 if local/state governments locally elected; =0, otherwise).
Ethnoling.Frac. (Iethnoling) Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization Easterly and Levine (1997)
The numbers are “normalized” between 0 and 1, where
1 corresponds to 93, the largest value (Tanzania) among the
102 countries in the original data set.Note: calculations are available upon request from the author.
162 B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166Appendix 2. Data coverage and summary statisticsFor regressions with expenditure decentralization:
Country Period Period average
Exp.
decentralization
Deﬁcit/GDP G GDPgr Population Governance Local elections Ethnoling.Frac. GNI per capita
(in logs)
Australia 1980–97 0.53 0.01 0.42 3.19 0.02 0.89 1 0.34 9.64
Austria 1980–94 0.42 0.05 0.54 2.21 0.01 0.87 1 0.14 9.57
Bolivia 1986–98 0.24 0.03 0.23 3.49 0.01 0.40 1 0.73 6.67
Brazil 1980–97 0.42 0.07 0.40 2.63 0.15 0.49 1 0.08 7.82
Canada 1980–97 0.70 0.04 0.56 2.34 0.03 0.89 1 0.81 9.69
Colombia 1982–86 0.35 0.02 0.17 2.96 0.03 0.30 1 0.06 7.09
France 1982–84 0.38 0.03 0.58 1.52 0.06 0.76 1 0.28 9.25
Germany 1995–96 0.57 0.02 0.56 1.25 0.08 0.85 1 0.03 10.26
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980–89 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.54 0.05 0.33 0 0.82 8.01
Malaysia 1985–95 0.21 0.03 0.34 6.96 0.02 0.52 1 0.77 7.84
Mexico 1980–97 0.23 0.05 0.24 2.66 0.08 0.47 1 0.32 7.96
Portugal 1987–88 0.07 0.08 0.38 6.94 0.01 0.78 0 0.01 8.38
South Africa 1984–85 0.23 0.04 0.36 1.38 0.03 0.54 1 0.95 7.74
Spain 1980–97 0.36 0.05 0.44 2.45 0.04 0.81 1 0.47 9.07
Switzerland 1980–84 0.73 0.00 0.39 1.66 0.01 0.95 1 0.54 9.78
United States 1980–98 0.60 0.03 0.41 2.65 0.25 0.85 1 0.54 9.96
DC average: 0.53 0.03 0.48 2.29 0.06 0.86 1.00 0.45 9.57
LDC average: 0.22 0.05 0.30 3.44 0.05 0.48 0.73 0.47 7.69
For regressions with revenue decentralization:
Country Period Period average
Rev.
decentralization
Deﬁcit/GDP G GDPgr Population Governance Local elections Ethnoling.Frac. GNI per capita
(in logs)
Australia 1980–97 0.28 0.01 0.42 3.19 0.02 0.89 1 0.34 9.64
Austria 1980–94 0.27 0.05 0.54 2.21 0.01 0.87 1 0.14 9.57
Bolivia 1986–98 0.20 0.03 0.23 3.49 0.01 0.40 1 0.73 6.67
Brazil 1980–97 0.25 0.07 0.40 2.63 0.15 0.49 1 0.08 7.82
Canada 1980–97 0.53 0.04 0.56 2.34 0.03 0.89 1 0.81 9.69
Colombia 1980–86 0.19 0.01 0.17 3.03 0.03 0.30 1 0.06 7.09
Germany 1992–98 0.33 0.02 0.55 1.51 0.08 0.85 1 0.03 10.19
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980–89 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.54 0.05 0.33 0 0.82 8.01
Mexico 1980–98 0.21 0.04 0.24 2.78 0.08 0.47 1 0.32 7.98
Peru 1990–98 0.06 0.01 0.19 4.05 0.02 0.43 1 0.63 7.36
Portugal 1987–98 0.06 0.05 0.44 3.58 0.01 0.78 0 0.01 8.97
South Africa 1980–98 0.13 0.04 0.38 1.82 0.04 0.54 1 0.95 7.97
Spain 1980–97 0.15 0.05 0.44 2.45 0.04 0.81 1 0.47 9.07
Switzerland 1980–98 0.45 0.00 0.46 1.51 0.01 0.95 1 0.54 10.22
United States 1980–98 0.41 0.03 0.41 2.65 0.25 0.85 1 0.54 9.96
DC average: 0.34 0.03 0.48 2.27 0.06 0.87 1.00 0.41 9.76
LDC average: 0.14 0.04 0.29 2.74 0.05 0.47 0.73 0.45 7.73Source: based on the sources and author's own calculations reported in Appendix 1.
Appendix 3. Correlations among the major variables used in the empirical analysis
Note: shaded cells indicate correlations that are more than 80%.
FDexp FDexp-
extreme
Fdrev FDrev-
extreme
FDexp*
population
FDexp*
governance
FDexp*
local elec.
FDexp*
ethnoling.frac.
FDrev*
population
FDrev*
governance
FDrev*
local elec.
FDrev*
ethnoling.frac.
Population Governance Local
elections
Ethnoling.
Frac.
FDexp 1.00
FDexp-extreme 0.09 1.00
Fdrev 0.91 −0.17 1.00
FDrev-extreme −0.27 0.66 −0.40 1.00
FDexp*population 0.35 0.13 0.36 −0.33 1.00
FDexp*governance 0.96 0.00 0.88 −0.35 0.26 1.00
FDexp*local elec. 0.99 0.10 0.90 −0.24 0.35 0.94 1.00
FDexp*ethnoling.
frac.
0.75 −0.38 0.837 −0.6 0.20 0.78 0.73 1.00
FDrev*population 0.33 0.08 0.38 −0.35 0.99 0.26 0.33 0.21 1.00
FDrev*governance 0.92 −0.17 0.96 −0.46 0.28 0.96 0.91 0.85 0.30 1.00
FDrev* local elec. 0.92 −0.13 0.99 −0.35 0.36 0.88 0.93 0.80 0.38 0.95 1.00
FDrev*
ethnoling.frac.
0.68 −0.47 0.83 −0.68 0.18 0.71 0.66 0.98 0.21 0.82 0.80 1.00
Population 0.17 0.10 0.20 −0.26 0.97 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.96 0.11 0.21 0.03 1.00
Governance 0.77 0.13 0.64 −0.20 0.15 0.89 0.77 0.58 0.14 0.80 0.65 0.47 −0.03 1.00
Local elections 0.06 −0.57 0.22 −0.68 −0.04 0.17 0.04 0.65 −0.01 0.27 0.17 0.68 −0.11 0.03 1.00
Ethnoling.Frac. 0.57 0.31 0.49 0.26 0.20 0.45 0.63 0.27 0.19 0.40 0.58 0.21 0.12 0.40 −0.29 1.00
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164 B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166Appendix 4. Panel unit root test resultsDefGDP GDPgr G/GDP FDexp FDrev lnGDpc
LLC-test: −1.930 −11.719 −2.366 0.897 −0.379 2.430
p-value 0.030 0.000 0.009 0.815 0.352 0.993
With Linear Trend
LLC-test: −0.193 −11.456 −3.885 −3.064 −2.478 −1.792
p-value 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.037
Optimal lags(*): 3 2 2 3 2 2(*) Based on Schwatz Information Criteria.Appendix 5a. Determining the range of signiﬁcance for the marginal effect of FDexp*Iij (Dashed lines show the 95%
conﬁdence band)
165B. Neyapti / European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 155–166Appendix 5b. Determining the range of signiﬁcance for the marginal effect of FDrev*Iij (Dashed lines show the 95%
conﬁdence band)Appendix 6. Comparing FDrev with Stegarescu (2005)'s measures for 1996–2001, where available
Country: RD1 RD2 RD3 FDrev
Austria 0.13 0.34 0.34 0.25
Australia 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33
Canada 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.53
US 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.42(Note: RD1, RD2 and RD3 are taken from Figure 3 of Stegarescu, 2005.).
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